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ABSTRACT
This article examines the implications of the potential entry of a copycat who produces
and sells a copycat (i.e., imitation) product that competes with the incumbent product.
By analyzing a two-period dynamic noncooperative game between these two firms, we
identify conditions under which the copycat can gain successful market entry. More
importantly, we find that the potential entry of a copycat creates (implicit) pressure for
the incumbent to lower its selling price; hence, it improves consumer welfare. Finally,
we identify conditions under which the potential entry of a copycat can increase social
welfare (i.e., consumer welfare and the profit of both firms). [Submitted: February 9,
2015. Revised: May 15, 2015. Accepted: May 16, 2015.]
Subject Areas: Copycat, Dynamic Pricing, Entry Strategy, and Incumbent.
INTRODUCTION
“We are helpless against copyist who prey on our ideas. Fashion design is
intellectual property that deserves protection.”
Cofounder of Proenza Schouler, Lazaro Hernandez (2011).
The existing supply network in China, inconsistent law enforcement and
large under-served markets have enabled many firms in China and other developing
countries to produce and sell copycat products (i.e., fake replicas of the genuine
product) (Siu, Tseng, Hoyt, & Lee, 2010; Tse, Ma, & Hung, 2010). These copycat
products are profitable because they enjoy lower production costs by piggybacking
on the R&D of the incumbent firm. Consequently, copycat products can afford to
sell at a fraction of the price of genuine products by taking advantage of the brand
value of those real genuine products. In this article, we focus on imitation products
in the durable goods category that are nondeceptive in the sense that customers
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are aware of the copycat products are not genuine (Cho, Fang, & Sridhar, 2014).i
Examples include Invicta prodiver watch is known as the imitation of Rolex’s
Submariner; Ninebot of China is known as the copycat of the U.S. Segway (a
self-balancing scooter); BYD’s F-3 is known as the copycat of Toyota’s Corolla;
and Shuanghuan Small Noble is known as the “look alike” of Daimler’s Smart car.
In view of the omnipresence of copycats, we are interested to examine the
impact of the potential entry of copycats on the incumbent firm, consumer welfare,
and social welfare. Specifically, we seek to examine three research questions:
(i) What are the conditions for the copycat to enter the market successfully?
(ii) How does the potential entry of a copycat impact the incumbent’s price?
(iii) Does the presence of potential copycats improve consumer welfare and
social welfare?
Preview of Key Results
To examine the above questions, we present a two-period dynamic noncooperative
game to capture the strategic interactions between an incumbent and a copycat.
At the beginning of the first period, the incumbent launches a new product and
sets its selling price for the first period. After observing the sales and the selling
price in the first period, the copycat would decide whether to enter the market.
Upon observation of the copycat’s entry strategy, the incumbent would then decide
whether to stay in to compete with the copycat or exit the market at the beginning
of the second period. By examining the equilibrium outcomes, we obtain three key
results:
(i) A copycat firm can enter the market successfully by offering a product
that resembles closely to the incumbent’s product.
(ii) The potential entry of the copycat creates (implicit) pressure for the
incumbent to lower its selling price.
(iii) The potential entry of the copycat increases consumer welfare, and it can
also increase social welfare (i.e., sum of consumer surplus and the total
profit of both firms) if the initial R&D cost incurred by the incumbent is
sufficiently low.
In addition to these three key results, we also find that the incumbent’s profit
can suffer significantly if it fails to anticipate the potential entry of the copycat.
Our article makes two key contributions. First, our article is the first to exam-
ine the impact of the potential entry of the copycat by taking product resemblance
into consideration. Second, our dynamic game analysis enables us to show that the
potential entry of the copycat can force the incumbent to lower its selling price,
and it can also increase consumer welfare as well as social welfare.
i There are imitation products that are deceptive and consumers are not being notified that the products are
not genuine. In China, deceptive products such as fake drugs, milk powder, and other food products have
created major concerns about food safety in China due to product adulteration (Tang & Babich, 2014). To
avoid the legal issues associated with the loss of human lives due to the use of deceptive imitation foods,
drugs, etc., we do not deal with deceptive imitation durable goods in this article.
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Literature Review
The extant literature on copycats (or counterfeits) has been focusing on the demand
of counterfeits in which price, attitudes toward big branded companies and the
need for status signaling, have been cited as the main factors of driving counterfeit
demand (Bloch, Bush, & Campbell, 1993; Wee, Tan, & Cheok, 1995; Cordell,
Kieschnick, & Wongtada, 1996; Tom, Garibaldi, Zeng, & Pilcher, 1998; Kwong,
Yan, Lee, Sin, & Tse, 2003; Wilcox, Kim, & Sen, 2009; Han, Nunes, & Drze,
2010). Using a Cournot competition model, Grossman and Shapiro (1988) studied
the case when the quality of the product is not observable, and they concluded that
policies that deter counterfeiting may not improve social welfare. This finding is
consistent with Cho et al. (2014). Qian (2014) examined the economic impact of
copycats and the impact on the brand management strategy of firms. Qian, Gong,
and Chen (2014) further examined how incumbents may seek to differentiate their
products in response to entries by (deceptive) counterfeit entities. The issue of
counterfeits has also been approached from the perspective of operations research
(Liu, Li, Wu, & Lai, 2005; Sun, Debo, Kekre, & Xie, 2010; Zhang, Hong, &
Zhang, 2012) or from the perspective of the supply of counterfeits (Conner &
Rumelt, 1991; Olsen & Granzin, 1992). More recently, using data from Chinese
shoe companies, Qian (2008) finds that brand-name companies tend to improve
their product quality after the entry of copycats. Unlike this stream of research,
we focus on how the strategic interaction between an incumbent and a potential
copycat.
Our article is also related to the literature on entry deterrence and accom-
modation games. Spence (1977, 1979) and Dixit (1979, 1980) study how to apply
capacity and capital investments to deter entry and find that carrying excess capac-
ity or increasing investment levels may be needed for incumbents to prevent entry.
Schmalensee (1978) demonstrates how product proliferation can be an effective
entry deterrence strategy with an analysis inspired by the U.S. ready-to-eat break-
fast cereal industry. Schmalensee (1983) further analyzes whether it is possible
to make an analogy between the use of capital investments and advertising as an
entry-deterrence tool. He finds that the incumbent may prefer to deter only by un-
derinvestment but never by overinvestment. Liu and Zhang (2006) and Liu, Gupta,
and Zhang (2006) study entry-deterrence decisions in the context of e-tailing and
secondary markets while Seamans (2012) demonstrates how private cable TV com-
panies adopt technology upgrades to counter potential entry threats by public firms.
In addition, Xiao and Qi (2010) study how the incumbent supplier in a two-stage
supply chain reacts to the potential entry of a second supplier through wholesale
pricing, and Matsui (2012) shows how the integration of a firm’s manufacturing
and marketing channels can be effective in deterring a potential entry. Finally,
Hung and Schmitt (1988), Donnenfeld and Weber (1992, 1995), Lehmann-Grube
(1997), Peitz (2002), Lutz (1997), and Noh and Moschini (2006) study the use
of quality as a vertical product differentiation strategy together with price deci-
sions in various entry scenarios. In particular, Lutz (1997) and Noh and Moschini
(2006), and more recently Karaer and Erhun (2014) incorporate cost of quality into
their entry deterrence game. Despite the fact that copycat and incumbent can be
differentiated by product quality, quality as a deterrence tool is not the main focus
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of our article. Rather, we identify the relative utilities that the two products bring
to the consumers as an important parameter in the strategic interactions between
the incumbent and the copycat, a perspective that is different from these papers.
Ultimately, our article complements the existing research literature by examining
the implications of copycat’s resemblance on its entry strategy, consumer welfare,
and social welfare.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the following two sections,
we present the base model and the key findings. In the subsequent section, we
examine the impact of the potential copycat on consumer and social welfare. Next,
we consider the case when incumbent company does not anticipate the potential
entry of copycat. We show that this ignorance can lead to significant loss. We
discuss the managerial implications and the limitations of our model in the last
section. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
MODELING FRAMEWORK
We consider a two-period dynamic game with observable actions between the
incumbent I and the copycat firm C. As described in the above section, we shall
focus on copycat of an incumbent’s product in the durable good category so that
the consumer is aware of the fact that the copycat’s product is not the genuine
incumbent’s product. Also, because C can piggyback on I ’s product development,
the production cost of C is lower than I . To capture this feature, we let c be the
unit production cost of I in both periods, where c ∈ (0, 1], and we scale the unit
production cost of C to 0 for ease of exposition. We assume that the production
cost of both firms is common knowledge.
Sequence of Events
At the beginning of Period 1, I launches a new product and determines its selling
price p1, and all consumers make their purchase decisions in Period 1. For those
consumers who did not purchase the product I in Period 1, they stay in the market
for potential purchase in Period 2. At the beginning of Period 2, upon observing p1,
C first decides whether to “enter” the market (by incurring an entry fee κ (> 0)) or
to “stay out.” The entry fee here is modeled as exogenous. Then, I would decide
whether to “exit” from or “stay in” the market. Once the entry and exit decisions
are made and observed by both I and C, Firm j (j = I, C) will determine its
selling price pj for Period 2 with cognizant of the presence or absence of the
other firm.ii Figure 1 shows the sequence of the game and the four subgames in
Period 2.
Consumer Valuation of I’s and C’s Product over Time
In our model, consumers are heterogeneous in their product valuations. Also, their
valuations of the products can change over time. For tractability of the analysis
iiWe have modeled the entry decision of C and the decision of I in Period 2 as a sequential game and not
as a simultaneous game. This is because the latter may lead to mixed strategies at the equilibrium, thereby
providing less insight. Furthermore, a sequential framework is closer to reality in the sense that I always
adjusts its strategy in Period 2, depending on what it observes to be the entry decision of C.
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Figure 1: Game tree.
associated with our two-period dynamic game that involves the comparison of
the equilibrium outcomes of four subgames as described earlier, we make three
assumptions. First, we normalize the market size to 1 and each consumer has at most
one unit of demand over the two periods. Second, we assume that v1, the consumer’s
valuation for I ’s product in Period 1, follows a uniform distribution between 0 and
1 so that v1 ∼ U [0, 1].iii Third, we assume throughout that consumers are myopic:
in Period 1, consumers do not form expectations about the price of I ’s product in
Period 2; and they do not postpone their purchase in Period 1 in anticipation of a
copycat product in Period 2. The first two assumptions are standard assumptions
for modeling consumer demand of durable goods and for modeling heterogeneous
consumer’s valuation. The reader is referred to van Ackere and Reyniers (1995)
and Yin and Tang (2014) for details. The third assumption is also reasonable
when the consumers are concerned only about their utilities in the current period
and discount heavily about future utilities so that they are effectively myopic.
The reader is referred to Beggs and Klemperer (1992) and Cachon and Swinney
(2009) for additional justifications. (We shall discuss the limitations of our model
in the concluding section.) In view of these three assumption, a rational consumer
will purchase I ’s product in Period 1 if and only if (v1 − p1) ≥ 0. Consumers
who purchase I ’s product in Period 1 will leave the market, while all remaining
consumers will stay in the market in Period 2.
For each remaining consumer in Period 2, he will use his valuation of I ’s
product in Period 1 (i.e., v1) as the “benchmark” to value both the incumbent’s
and the copycat’s products in Period 2. Specifically, he will value I ’s product in
Period 2 at v2, where v2 = αv1 and α represents the value retention factor so that
iii Uniform valuation is commonly assumed in the economics and operations literature especially for
analyzing two-period dynamic games. For example, van Ackere and Reyniers (1995) and Yin and Tang
(2014) impose the uniform valuation assumption when examining different product trade-in policies over
two time periods.
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Table 1: Table of notations.
Parameters
c I ’s unit production cost (C’s unit cost is scaled to 0)
κ Entry fee for C to enter the market
v1(v2) Consumer’s valuation of I ’s product in Period 1 (Period 2)
vC Consumer’s valuation of C’s product in Period 2
α Value retention factor
β Physical resemblance factor
Decision Variables
p
(k)
1 I ’s price in Period 1 in Subgame k, where k = 1, 2, 3, 4
p
(k)
I (p(k)C ) I ’s (C’s) price in Period 2 in Subgame k
π
(k)
I (π (k)C ) I ’s (C’s) profit in Period 2 in Subgame k
α ∈ (0, 1).iv This assumption is a standard assumption for most common durable
goods (e.g., cell phones, home appliances, and regular cars) under consideration.v
Similarly, each remaining consumer in Period 2 (who values I ’s product at v2)
will value C’s product at vC , where vC = βv2 and β can be interpreted as the
resemblance level of the product of C to that of I so that β ∈ (0, 1). As we shall
see, the value retention factor α and the resemblance level β will play a crucial
role in the strategic interactions between I and the potential copycat C. For ease
of reference, all the notations used in this article is provided in Table 1.
Benchmark Case
Before we analyze the two-period dynamic game, let us first establish a benchmark
for the case when copycats are nonexistent (due to tight law enforcement or other
technological challenges). In this case, I operates as a monopoly in both periods
who sets pB1 in Period 1 and pB2 in Period 2, where the superscript “B” to denote
the equilibrium outcomes of the Base Model. By considering the demand in each
period along with the value retention factor α, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1: Consider the Base Model in which copycats are nonexistent. If c ≤ α2−α ,
I stays in the market for both periods and sets pB1 = 2+c4−α , pB2 = α+2c4−α in equilibrium
and obtains a profit πB = c2−(3−α)αc+α4α−α2 . However, if c > α2−α , I exits the market in
Period 2, sets pB1 = c+12 in equilibrium, and obtains a profit πB = (1−c)
2
4 .
Even though I is the monopoly in both periods, I will not be able to generate
any positive demand in Period 2 when c > α2−α unless it sets its selling price below
iv Without loss of generality, we also assume that α > c. This is because the valuation of the consumers in
Period 2 is no more than αv1, which is less than α. If α < c, then no one values the product more than c in
Period 2. Then, it is clear that I will always exit the market in Period 2 since its marginal cost is higher than
the valuations of the consumers.
v However, for collectible or rare items such as classic cars, vintage jewelries, or fine arts that we do not
consider in our article, the value retention factor α ≥ 1.
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cost c which is not profitable. Consequently, it is optimal for I to exit the market
in Period 2 and simply chooses pB1 = c+12 that maximizes its profit in Period 1,
which is given by (1 − p1)(p1 − c).
ANALYSIS OF THE TWO-PERIOD DYNAMIC NONCOOPERATIVE
GAME
We use backward induction to analyze our two-period dynamic game by first ex-
amining the subgames that take place in Period 2. Depending on the entry decision
of C and the exit decision of I , there are four possible subgames associated with
any price p1 selected by I in Period 1 as depicted in Figure 1. Clearly, these en-
try/exit decisions affect the pricing strategy of each firm in Period 2. For notational
convenience, we denote a subgame by (σI , σC) where σj is the entry or exit strat-
egy of Firm j in Period 2 so that σI ∈ {StayIn,Exit}, σC ∈ {Enter, StayOut}.
By labeling each subgame according to an index k, we can use Subgame k = 1
to denote the subgame associated with (StayIn, StayOut) (i.e., I stays in the
market while C stays out the market in Period 2). Similarly, Subgame k = 2 cor-
responds to the game associated with (Exit, Enter), Subgame k = 3 corresponds
to (StayIn,Enter), and Subgame k = 4 corresponds to (Exit, StayOut).
Analysis of Four Subgames in Period 2
In Period 2, p1 has already been selected by I in Period 1, and consumers with
valuation v1 ≥ p1 would have purchased I ’s product in Period 1 already. Because
v1 ∼ U [0, 1], there are p1 remaining customers in Period 2 with valuation v1 <
p1. Also, observe that the valuation of I ’s product and C’s product in Period
2 equal v2 = αv1 and vC = βv2; respectively, where v2 ∼ U [0, αp1] and vC ∼
U [0, βαp1]. By considering the product valuation v2 and vC in Period 2 for any
given p1, we can analyze Subgame k (k = 1, 2, 3, 4). (For notation convenience,
we use the superscript (k) to denote the various parameters associated with the
equilibrium outcome of Subgame k.)
Analysis of Subgame 1: (Stay In, Stay Out)
When C stays out of the market in Period 2 so that π (1)C = 0, I operates as a
monopoly in Period 2. Recall from above that there are p1 remaining customers in
Period 2 with valuation v2 ∼ U [0, αp1]. Hence, for any given p2, each remaining
customer in Period 2 will purchase the product with probability αp1−p2
αp1
. Therefore,
the demand in Period 2 for I is given byD(1)2 (p1, p2, pC) = p1 · αp1−p2αp1 = 1α (αp1 −
p2) and the profit of I in Period 2 is π (1)2 (p1, p2, pC) = 1α (αp1 − p2)(p2 − c). As
I chooses p(1)2 that maximizes π
(1)
2 (p1, p2, pC), we obtain p(1)2 (p1) = αp1+c2 and
π
(1)
2 (p1) = 1α (αp1−c2 )2.
Analysis of Subgame 2: (Exit, Enter)
When I exits the market in Period 2 so that π (2)2 = 0, C operates as a monopoly
in Period 2. By noting that p1 remaining customers in period 2 and they value
C’s product at vC ∼ U [0, βαp1], we can conclude that, for any given pC , each
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remaining customer in Period 2 will purchase C’s product with probability βαp1−pC
αβp1
so that the demand of C’s product is given by D(2)C (p1, p2, pC) = p1 · βαp1−pCαβp1 =
1
αβ
(αβp1 − pC).
By considering the copycat’s entry fee κ and by noting that the pro-
duction cost of C is scaled to zero, C can choose pC to maximize its
profit π (2)C (p1, p2, pC) = 1αβ (αβp1 − pC)pC − κ , getting p(2)C (p1) = αβ2 p1 and
π
(2)
C (p1) = αβ4 p21 − κ . Observe that C’s profit π (2)C (p1) is increasing in p1. Hence,
I can deter the entry of C in Period 2 by lowering its price p1 in Period 1 so that I
can capture most of the market in Period 1, making the remaining market to small
for C to make a profitable entry in Period 2. (We shall examine this issue when we
analyze I ’s equilibrium price p1 in Period 1 in a later section.)
Analysis of Subgame 3: (Stay In, Enter)
Subgame 3 is more complex because it involves both I and C competing for those
p1 remaining customers in Period 2. Before we determine the profit functions
of each firm, we need to specify the purchasing decision of each remaining cus-
tomer when facing with both I ’s and C’s products selling at price p2 and pC ;
respectively. First, by noting that v2 ∼ U [0, αp1] and vC ∼ U [0, βαp1], we can
use the individual rationality constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint
to show that a remaining consumer will buy from C in Period 2 if and only if
vC − pC = βv2 − pC ≥ max(0, v2 − p2), which reduces to p2−pC1−β ≥ v2 ≥ pCβ , or
p2 >
pC
β
. (1)
Second, by using the same argument, a remaining consumer will buy from I
in Period 2 if and only if v2 − p2 ≥ max(0, βv2 − pC), or v2 ≥ p2−pC1−β . Because
v2 ∼ U [0, αp1], we must have
0 ≤ p2 − pC
1 − β ≤ αp1. (2)
By using the above purchasing rules, the demand for I is 1
α
(αp1 − p2−pC1−β )
and the demand for C is 1
α
(p2−pC1−β − pCβ ). Hence, the profits for I and C in Period 2
in Subgame 3 can be written as: π (3)2 (p1, p2, pC) = 1α (αp1 − p2−pC1−β )(p2 − c) and
π
(3)
C (p1, p2, pC) = 1α (p2−pC1−β − pCβ )pC − κ; respectively. Given the profit functions,
we can solve the corresponding simultaneous move game and show that the equi-
librium prices are given as p(3)2 (p1) = 2α(1−β)p1+c4−β and p(3)C (p1) = β α(1−β)p1+c4−β .
Observe that I will charge a higher price in equilibrium because p(3)2 (p1) =
2
β
p
(3)
C (p1) > p(3)C (p1). This result is intuitive because I has a higher production
cost.
By substituting the equilibrium prices into the corresponding profit functions,
it is easy to check that the profits of both firms can be written as π (3)2 (p1) =
1−β
α(4−β)2 (2αp1 − 2−β1−β c)2 and π (3)C (p1) = β(1−β)α(4−β)2 (αp1 + c1−β )2 − κ . Here, we obtain
a similar result as in Subgame 2: the profits of both firms in equilibrium are
increasing in p1; and, hence, I can reduce C’s profit in Period 2 by setting a lower
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price p1 in Period 1. Moreover, observe that C’s profit π (3)C (p1) is increasing in α
and β. This observation implies that these parameters play an important role in the
determining the successful entry of C, which we will elaborate in a later section.
Subgame 4: C (Exit, Stay Out)
When I exits the market and C stays out of the market, π (4)2 = π (4)C = 0.
Analysis of the Metagame in Period 1
By anticipating which subgame will take place in Period 2 and the corresponding
profit that I will obtain in Period 2, we now determine I ’s selling price p1 in Period
1. From the perspective of I , there are three possible scenarios, namely, I faces
no competition in Period 2, I exits the market in Period 2, and I faces potential
competition from C in Period 2. For each scenario, we first analyze the price that
I will charge in Period 1 the corresponding total profit that I will obtain in both
periods. (Then, in the following subsection, we shall compare I ’s total profit across
all three scenarios and determine I ’s dominant entry and pricing strategy in both
periods and the corresponding C’s entry and pricing strategy in Period 2.)
Scenario 1: I faces no competition in Period 2 (Subgame 1)
When C cannot have positive demand in Period 2, we say I faces no competition
in Period 2. In this case, the situation mirrors that of the Base Model as presented
in Section “Benchmark Case.” Hence, p∗1 = pB1 = 2+c4−α and the total profit π∗ =
πB = c2−(3−α)αc+α4α−α2 obtained in both periods are as given in Lemma 1.
Scenario 2: I exits in Period 2 (Subgames 2 and 4)
Under this scenario, I chooses to Exit in Period 2. In this case, the total profit
obtained in both periods is essentially the expected profit obtained in Period 1,
that is, π = (1 − p1)(p1 − c). In this case, I will set p∗1 = c+12 and obtain a profit
π∗ = ( 1−c2 )2.
Scenario 3: I faces potential competition from C in Period 2 (Subgames 3
and 1)
When C can have positive demand in Period 2, we say I faces potential competition
in Period 2.
When I anticipates thatC can have a positive demand in Period 2, its expected
profit in both periods can be expressed as
π∗ = max
p1
{
(1 − p1)(p1 − c) + 1
α
(
αp1 − p
(3)
2 (p1) − p(3)C (p1)
1 − β
) (
p
(3)
2 (p1) − c
)}
,
where p1 must satisfy the individual rationality and the incentive compatibility
constraint (1) and (2) associated with p(3)2 (p1) and p(3)C (p1) as given in Subgame
3. After determining I ’s optimal price, p∗I , we can determine the corresponding
optimal profit for the copycat, π (3)C(p∗1), as given in Subgame 3 in Section “Anal-
ysis of Subgame 3: (Stay In, Enter)” so that C enters the market if π (3)C(p∗1) > 0
(Subgame 3) and stays out of the market otherwise (Subgame 1).
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Entry Strategies of I and C in Equilibrium
By comparing I ’s total profit across all three scenarios presented in the previous
subsection, we can determine I ’s entry strategy in both periods and the corre-
sponding C’s entry strategy in Period 2. As we compare the total profits π∗ across
all three scenarios, we can map out the dominant entry strategy of both firms
according to the zone within which (c,√κ) lies. To prepare us to describe these
zones in a succinct manner, let us define the three thresholds c1, c2, c3 associated
with I ’s production cost c, where
c1 = α2 − α , c2 =
4α(1 − β)
4(2 − α) − β(4 − 3α) , c3 =
α(1 − β)
1 + (1 − α)(1 − β) . (3)
Because α, β ∈ [0, 1], it is easy to check that 1 > c1 > c2 > c3 ≥ 0. For ease of
exposition, let us define two additional quantities. First, let us define ˜P is the solu-
tion of the following quadratic equation: f (x) = (1 − x)(x − c) + 14α (αx − c)2 =
(1−c)2
4 . Second, we define ˆP is the solution of the following quadratic equation:
g(x) = (1 − x)(x − c) + 1
4α
(αx − c)2
=
(
M2
2N
+ (2 − β)
2
α(1 − β)
)
c2
(4 − β)2 +
(
M
N
− 1
)
c + (4 − β)
2
2N
,
where M = (4 − β)2 − 4(2 − β), and N = 2(4 − β)2 − 8α(1 − β).
By using the thresholds c1, c2, c3 and ˜P and ˆP as defined above, we can
describe the entry strategy of I and C over both periods as follows.
Theorem 1: The equilibrium entry strategies of I and C can be described as
follows:
(a) (High production cost c.) Suppose c > c1. Then I will always Exit in
Period 2. Also, if
√
κ ≤
√
αβ(c+1)
4 , C will Enter (as in Subgame 2);
otherwise, C will Stay Out (as in Subgame 4).
(b) (Moderate production cost c.) Suppose c1 ≥ c > c3. If √κ ≤
√
αβ ˜P
2 , then
I will Exit and C will Enter (as in Subgame 2). Otherwise, I will Stay
In and C will Stay Out (as in Subgame 1).
(c) (Low production cost c.) Suppose c ≤ c3. Then I will always Stay In. If√
κ <
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) ), C will Enter (as in Subgame 3). Otherwise,
C will Stay Out (as in Subgame 1).
By using the entry strategy of both firms as stated in Theorem 1, we can
retrieve the corresponding p∗1 that I will charge in Period 1 by using the result
as stated in the previous subsection. Also, we can use p∗1 to determine all other
equilibrium outcomes (e.g., total profit of I in both periods, profit of C in Period 2,
the selling price of I in Period 2 and the selling price of C in Period 2) associated
with each subgame through substitutions as presented in Section “Analysis of
Four Subgames in Period 2.” For ease of exposition, we move the details in the
Appendix.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium entry strategies of the incumbent and the copycat.
In order to study the impact of the potential threat of C on I , it is worthwhile
to compare the subgame when C does not enter the market in equilibrium (as in
Subgame 1) with the benchmark case (i.e., when C are nonexistent). By comparing
I ’s equilibrium prices in both periods, in Subgame 1, with I ’s prices in the Base
Case as presented in Lemma 1, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 2: In Subgame 1, I ’s optimal prices in both periods are lower than those
in the Base Case, that is, p∗1 ≤ pB1 and p∗2 ≤ pB2 .
Lemma 2 reveals that the potential entry of copycat C does create (implicit)
pressure for the incumbent I to lower its price in both periods. Hence, the presence
of copycat C may increase consumer surplus, which we shall examine in the next
section. In the following subsection, we shall focus on the entry strategy of both
firms in equilibrium.
Equilibrium entry strategy map
We now map out the equilibrium entry strategy in Period 2 as stated Theorem 1
according to different zones within which (c,√κ) lies (Figure 2). Then we discuss
the impact of the value retention factor α, the extent of the physical resemblance β,
entry cost κ , and marginal production cost c on the entry strategies of both firms.
First, consider the case when I ’s production cost c is much higher than that
of C’s so that c > c1. In this case, Figure 2 confirms our intuition that I ’s dominant
strategy is to Exit the market in Period 2 regardless of C’s entry decision or the
value of
√
κ . Essentially, I will select his pricing strategy associated with Scenario
2 (Subgames 2 and 4) as described in previous subsection, so that p∗1 = pB1 = c+12 ,
which is independent of κ . This explains the first statement of Theorem 1.
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Second, consider the case when I ’s production cost is low so that c < c3 as
stated in the third statement of Theorem 1. In this case, it is a dominant strategy for
I to Stay In the market in Period 2 as illustrated in Figure 2. However, I chooses
p∗1 in response to C’s strategy, which depends on
√
κ . First, when
√
κ is low so
that C will enter the market in Period 2 so that I will select his pricing strategy
associated with Scenario 3 (Subgame 3) as described in the previous subsection.
Next, when
√
κ is high so that C will stay out the market in Period 2 so that I
will select his pricing strategy associated with Scenario 1 or 3 (Subgame 1) as
described in the previous subsection.
Third, when I ’s production cost c is moderate so that c1 ≥ c ≥ c3 as stated
in the second statement of Theorem 1. In this case, Figure 2 reveals that both firms
will change their entry strategy in opposite direction as C’s entry fee
√
κ exceeds
a certain threshold. Specifically, when
√
κ is low, C will Enter (due to low entry
fee) and I will Exit in Period 2 (under Subgame 2) because of the competition
and moderately high c. However, when
√
κ exceeds a certain threshold given by√
αβ ˜P
4 , C will Stay Out (due to high entry fee) and I will Stay In (under Subgame
1) and ˜P is given in Theorem 1. Much as the case where the incumbent is “kicked
out” of the market by the copycat is rare in reality, we note that there are indeed
such examples, including the case when Acer took out Texas Instrument in the PC
market, when HTC took out Compaq/HP in the PDA market, and when Ninebot
took out Segway in the self-balancing scooter market.
The impact of product characteristics (α, β, c) and market characteristics
(κ) on entry strategy
We now examine the impact of product resemblance factor β, value retention factor
α, I ’s production cost c, and C’s entry fee κ on the equilibrium entry strategy by
examining how this factors affect the boundaries of the various zones as described
in Theorem 1 (and as depicted in Figure 2).
The impact of product resemblance factor β. Consider a situation in which the
resemblance factor β becomes lower. When β becomes smaller, it is easy to
check from Figure 2 (or from Theorem 1) that the “boundary values” associated
with
√
κ (i.e., the quantities
√
αβ(c+1)
4 ,
√
αβ ˜P
4 ,
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) )) become lower.
Hence, the size of those “upper zones” within which C will Stay Out of the market
becomes bigger as β becomes lower. This observation implies that, to deter C from
entering the market, I can design products to make it difficult for C to replicate.
For example, in the single coffee serving market, Nespresso uses unique design
of its machine and its coffee capsules to deter copycat’s entry. (On the contrary,
Keurig’s K-cup capsules were easy to copy, leading to many copycats such as
Simple Cups and EZ-Cups to enter the market.)
The impact of value retention factor α. By using the same argument as before,
one can observe from Figure 2 (or from Theorem 1) that the “boundary values”
associated with
√
κ (i.e., the quantities
√
αβ(c+1)
4 ,
√
αβ ˜P
4 ,
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) )) be-
come lower when the value retention factor α becomes lower. To deter copycat’s
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entrance, this observation suggests that I should develop strategies to reduce the
retention value of its genuine product α. For example, the incumbent firm I can
lower its value retention factor α by offering frequent upgrades and changes in the
design so that consumers value the existing product less, that is, α for the existing
product becomes low, thus deterring C in the process. This result is consistent with
the design strategy adopted by some conspicuous luxury brands such as Louis
Vuitton who are now offering new designs or marginal changes to existing designs
more frequently.
The impact of I ’s production cost c. By using the same approach, one can
argue that I can reduce the potential threat from C by reducing its own marginal
production cost c. When the marginal production cost c is lower, I can afford to
lower its price p1 in Period 1 to capture the bulk of market, making the remaining
market less attractive for C to enter in Period 2.
The impact of C’s entry fee κ . As shown in Figure 2 (and Theorem 1), copycat C
will Stay Out of the market when the entry fee κ is sufficiently high. Therefore, to
deter C from entering the market, I can consider developing strategies to increase
the entry fee for C to enter the market. For example, besides lobbying for stronger
government regulations, I can file more patents and then use patent infringement
charges as a way to increase the entry barrier for copycats to produce and sell
imitation or counterfeit products. This can be one way to deter C from entering
the market. Paik and Zhu (2013) established empirical evidence that shows patent
wars in the United States and Europe among different cell phone companies have
deterred copycats from entering these markets.
In summary, to fend off the copycat, the incumbent can implement product-
related strategies to ensure that C cannot gain from being physically similar to its
product (resulting in low β) and to offer frequent upgrades or new designs (giving
rise to low α). At the same time, the incumbent can complement these product-
related strategies with market-related ones, such as implementing strategies which
increase entry fee (κ) and decrease marginal production cost (c) to deter the entry
of potential copycat and protect its monopoly position in the market.
CONSUMER SURPLUS AND SOCIAL WELFARE
We now utilize the entry strategy stated in Theorem 1 along with the corresponding
equilibrium outcomes (i.e., p∗1 that I will charge in Period 1 and the total profit
of I in both periods π∗ as presented in section “Analysis of the Metagame in
Period 1,” and the profit of C in Period 2, the selling price of I in Period 2 and the
selling price of C in Period 2 associated with each subgame through substitutions
as presented in section “Analysis of Four Subgames in Period 2”) to examine the
impact of potential entry of copycats on consumer surplus and social welfare. As
shown in Lemma 2, the potential entry of the copycat can create pressure for the
incumbent to lower its selling price in Period 2, which will increase consumer
surplus. However, as shown in the last section, the incumbent may use pricing
strategy p∗1 to deter copycat from entering the market so that the incumbent can
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Table 2: Consumer surplus (Base Case).
Cost Consumer Surplus for the Base Model CSB
c ≤ α2−α 18 (α + 4)(( 2+c4−α − c+4α+4 )2 + 1α ( 2(α−c)α+4 )2)
c > α2−α
1
8 (1 − c)2
still operate as a monopoly in both periods. By accounting for the event that the
copycat may not enter the market in equilibrium, we examine consumer surplus
first and then social welfare in this section.
Consumer Surplus
To compute the consumer surplus, let us first consider the Base Model in which
I operates as a monopoly in both periods (i.e., when copycats are nonexistent).
By using the selling prices as stated in Lemma 1, we can determine the consumer
surplus CSB over two periods for the Base Model as follows.
In Period 1, v1 ∼ U [0, 1] and only those customers with v1 ≥ p1 will pur-
chase in Period 1. Hence, the total consumer surplus in Period 1 is
∫ 1
p1
(v1 −
p1)dv1 = (1−p1)22 . In Period 2, if I remains in the market, only consumers will
valuations v2 (= αv1) between p2 and αp1 will make a purchase. Thus, the to-
tal consumer surplus is 1
α
∫ αp1
p2
(v2 − p2)dv2 = 1α (αp1−p2)
2
2 , where v2 = αv1. From
Lemma 1, we note that I remains in the market in Period 2 if and only if c < α2−α .
By using the equilibrium price pB1 and pB2 as given in Lemma 1, we can determine
the consumer surplus for the Base Model as reported in Table 2.
By using the same approach, we can now derive the consumer sur-
plus (denoted by CS(k)(p1, p2, pC)) for the respective Subgame k for any
given p1, p2, and pC when the copycat may enter the market. In Subgame
1, I operates as a monopoly. Hence, we can use the above analysis to show
that CS(1)(p1, p2, pC) = (1−p1)22 + 1α (αp1−p2)
2
2 . In Subgame 2 where I exits in
Period 2 but C enters, the consumer surplus in Period 2 can be written
as CS
(2)
2 = 1αβ
∫ αp1
pC
(vC − pC)dvC = 1αβ (αβp1−pC )
2
2 , where vC = αβv1. Combining
with the consumer surplus in Period 1, CS(2)(p1, p2, pC) = (1−p1)22 + 1αβ (αβp1−pC )
2
2 .
In Subgame 3 where both firms compete in Period 2, the consumer surplus
can be derived as CS(3)2 (p1, p2, pC) = 1αβ
∫ β(p2−pC )
1−β
pC
(vC − pC)dvC + 1α
∫ αp1
p2−pC
1−β
(v2 −
p2)dv2 = 12αβ (β(p2−pC )1−β − pc)2 + 12α (αp1 − p2−pC1−β )2 where the first term is the con-
sumer surplus accruing to consumers buying from C and the second term is the
consumer surplus owing to consumers buying from I in Period 2.
Table 3 summarizes the total consumer surplus in Subgame k,
CS(k)(p1, p2, pC) (= CS1(pi1) + CS(k)2 (p1, p2, pC)) for any given prices
p1, p2, pC .
By substituting p(k)1 and p
(k)
2 and p
(k)
C associated with Subgame k as stated in
Theorem 3.1, we can obtain the corresponding consumer surplus in equilibrium.
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Table 3: Summary of consumer surplus.
Subgame k Consumer Surplus CS(k)(p(k)1 , p(k)2 , p(k)C )
1 : (StayIn, StayOut) (1−p1)22 + 1α (αp1−p2)
2
2
2 : (Exit, Enter) (1−p1)22 + 1αβ (αβp1−pC )
2
2
3 : (StayIn,Enter) (1−p1)22 + 12αβ ( β(p2−pC )1−β − pc)2 + 12α (αp1 − p2−pC1−β )2
4 : (Exit, StayOut) (1−p1)22
Figure 3: Consumer surplus and social surplus.
The expressions for the consumer surplus in equilibrium are complex so we omit
the details. Instead, we compare the consumer surplus in equilibrium associated
each subgame to that of the Base Model given in Table 2 and obtain the following
result.
Lemma 3: (Consumer Surplus) Relative to the Base Model, the potential entry of
the copycat will always improve consumer surplus; that is, CS(k)(p(k)1 , p(k)2 , p(k)C ) ≥
CSB for k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Lemma 3 reveals that, despite the nonentry decision of C, the mere presence
and potential entry of C is sufficient to force I to lower its selling price so that
consumers can obtain a higher surplus (as in Subgame 1). Figure 3 presents the
zones within which consumer can gain a strictly higher surplus when there is a
potential entry of C. Clearly, in the zones where C will Stay Out of the market
(especially when √κ is high), the consumer surplus is the same as the Base Model
where I operates as a monopoly. However, when the entry fee
√
κ is moderate and
I faces a real threat from the entrance of C, I would lower the selling price p∗1
further to deter the entry of C, thereby increasing consumer surplus. This occurs
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Table 4: Summary of social surplus.
Subgame k Social Welfare SS(k)(p1, p2, pc)
1 : (StayIn, StayOut) π (1)I (p1, p2, pc) + CS(1)(p1, p2, pc)
2 : (Exit, Enter) π (2)I (p1, p2, pc) + π (2)C (p1, p2, pc) + CS(2)(p1, p2, pc)
3 : (StayIn,Enter) π (3)I (p1, p2, pc) + π (3)C (p1, p2, pc) + CS(3)(p1, p2, pc)
4 : (Exit, StayOut) π (4)I (p1, p2, pc) + CS(4)(p1, p2, pc)
Table 5: Social surplus (Base Case).
Cost Social Surplus for Base Model SSB
c ≤ α2−α πB + 18 (α + 4)(( 2+c4−α − c+4α+4 )2 + 1α ( 2(α−c)α+4 )2)
c > α2−α π
B + 18 (1 − c)2
despite I remaining as a monopoly in Period 2 (Subgame 1). Finally, when √κ is
low, competition between I and C in Period 2 ensures that the prices in Period 2
are lower than that in the Base Model (Subgame 3). Alternatively, I may be forced
out of the market (Subgame 2). In either cases, consumer surplus increases as a
result.
Social Welfare
As seen above, the potential entry of the copycat will improve consumer surplus.
However, it may reduce the incumbent’s profit. Therefore, if we incorporate both
firms’ profits, it is unclear if the potential entry of the copycat will still increase
social welfare. To examine this issue, we now combine the firms’ profits and the
consumer surplus associated with each subgame as stated in Table 3. Table 4
summarizes the social welfare associated with Subgame k, k = 1, 2, 3, 4 for any
given prices p1, p2, pc.
Similarly, by using I ’s profit πB as stated in Lemma 1 and the consumer
surplus as given in Table 2, the social welfare associated with the Base Model is
summarized in Table 5.
By substituting p∗1 and p∗2 and p∗C associated with Subgame k as stated in
Theorem 3.1, we can obtain the corresponding social welfare in equilibrium. The
expressions for the social welfare in equilibrium are also complex, and we omit
the details. Instead, we compare the social welfare in equilibrium associated each
subgame to that of the base case given in Table 5 and obtain the following result.
Lemma 4: (Social Surplus) The potential entry of the copycat will always increase
social welfare relative to the Base Model.
Notice that the way the social welfare is calculated in Tables 4 and 5 does not
include the R&D costs incurred by the incumbent I before Period 1 (as sunk cost).
Therefore, when one accounts for the R&D costs incurred by the incumbent, we
can apply Lemma 4 to conclude that, as long as the R&D costs are not too high to
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deter I from launching its product, the potential entry of the copycat will increase
social welfare. This implies that much as the incumbent sees a reduction in its
profit owing to the presence of the copycat, the gain in consumer surplus (Lemma
3) and the copycat’s profit (if it enters) overshadow the incumbent’s loss (as in
Subgames 2 and 3). In summary, our result indicates that the potential entry of
copycats can create value for the society as a whole conditional on the incumbent
having committed on its R&D investment.vi
COST OF IGNORANCE
In this section, we investigate the consequences when I does not anticipate the
potential entry of a copycat proactively in Period 1. Without anticipation, I may
set a high selling price in Period 1, making the remaining market attractive for
copycats to enter in Period 2. Hence, being ignorant can affect I ’s profit in Period
2 negatively. In this section, we examine the implications of such ignorance on the
part of I .
To begin, consider the case when I does not take into consideration any
possibility of copycat entry in Period 2 so that I will set it price pR1 in Period
1 as if it is a monopoly in both periods.vii The “ignorant” model differs from
the two-period dynamic model in the sense that I does not proactively lower the
price p1 to capture the bulk of the market in Period 1 so as to deter C from
entering in Period 2 (when necessary). Therefore, by acting as a monopoly, we
can apply Lemma 1 to show that pR1 = pB1 . In Period 2, if C does not enter the
market, then pR2 = pB2 as in the Base Model. However, if C enters the market in
Period 2, then I has two possible reactive moves. In the first move, I stays in
the market to compete with C (under Subgame 3). Recall from the analysis of
Subgame 3 that (1) and (2) constitute the necessary conditions for both firms to
coexist in the market in Period 2. By considering these conditions along with the
fact that I sets pR1 = pB1 for being ignorant, we can substitute p(3)2 (pB1 ), p(3)C (pB1 )
into (2) to establish the condition for I to stay in the market and compete with
C (under Subgame 3), getting c ≤ 4α(1−β)4(2−α)−β(4−3α) . It is straightforward to deduce
that when both firms compete, the equilibrium prices in Period 2 for I and C
are pR2 (p1) = 2(α(1−β)p1+c4−β ), pRC (p1) = β(α(1−β)p1+c4−β ), respectively. In the second
move, I finds it unprofitable to compete with C especially when its production
cost c is greater than c2. Hence, I exits the market in Period 2 (under Subgame 2)
and obtains only the profit in Period 1 (i.e., (1 − pR1 )(pR1 − c)).
When I is ignorant about the potential entry of C in Period 1, there are three
possible consequences. First, when I ’s production cost is too high (c > c1), we
learn from Theorem 3.1 that I should exit the market in Period 2 regardless of
whether it takes into account the potential entry of C or not. In this case, there is
no negative consequence for being ignorant. Second, let us consider the case when
vi A key caveat is that the initial R&D investment is treated as sunk cost in our framework. Whether the
potential entry of copycats will reduce or not the incumbent’s investment in its product and hence, the
valuation of the consumers cannot be addressed here.
vii We use the superscript “R” to denote the parameters for the case where I is ignorant.
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Figure 4: Cost of ignorance.
the production cost c is moderate (i.e., when c3 < c < c1). Theorem 1 reveals that
only one firm should be in the market in equilibrium and that the entry decision
of C and the exit decision of I depend on the entry fee
√
κ . In this case, when
I is ignorant in Period 1, I may end up playing the “wrong” subgame in Period
2. Specifically, I may end up (i) competing directly with C in Period 2 under
Subgame 3 (even though I should have deterred the entry of C as in Subgame 1
had it been proactive) or (ii) being driven out of the market by C under Subgame 2
(even though I should have stayed in the market in Period 2 as a monopoly under
Subgame 1). In these cases, there are negative consequences for being ignorant.
Third, when the production cost c is low (i.e., when c < c3), I will always choose
to Stay In regardless of whether it has anticipated the potential entry of C or not.
However, being ignorant about the potential entry of C, I sets pR1 = pB1 , which
is higher than the price as stated in Theorem 3.1, resulting in a larger remaining
market in Period 2. Consequently, if C enters the market in Period 2, I ends up
playing Subgame 3 instead of Subgame 1. Moreover, I plays Subgame 3 with the
suboptimal price pR1 .
To examine the magnitude of the cost of ignorance on the part of I , Figure
4 presents the cost of ignorance associated with the aforementioned three possible
consequences.viii As shown in Figure 4, there is no negative consequences when
c > c1. However, when c < c1, there are negative consequences especially when
the entry fee
√
κ is between some thresholds (that vary with c). We find that the
reduction in I ’s profit due to its ignorance is at least 4%. However, the reduction in
viiiIn the figure, we let α = .9, β = .4. We further note that the cost of ignorance increases as α, β increase.
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I ’s profit can get even higher to 25% in the most serious case that occurs when I ’s
production cost c and the entry fee of C are moderate (i.e., when c3 < c < c1 and√
κ is moderate), where I is being driven out of the market by C under Subgame 2
(even though I should have stayed in the market in Period 2 under Subgame 1) or
when I ends up competing with C under Subgame 3 (even though I should have
deterred the entry of C in Period 2 under Subgame 1).
The following lemma formally states the conditions under which I ’s igno-
rance can cause its own exit in Period 2 (as stated in Statement 1) and the conditions
under which I ends up competing with C in Period 2 (as stated in Statement 2) that
would not occur had I taken the potential entry of C into consideration in Period
1.
Lemma 5: Suppose I ignores the potential entry of C in Period 1. Then, instead
of lowering p1 in Period 1 to deter C’s entry in Period 2,
(a) I is driven out of the market in Period 2 by the entry of C when c ∈
(c2, c1) and (1+c)
√
αβ
4 ≤
√
κ <
(2+c)√αβ
2(4−α) .
(b) I ends up competing with C in Period 2 when c ∈ (c3, c2) and
√
αβ ˜P
2 ≤√
κ <
√
αβ(1−β)(2α(1−β)+(4−αβ)c)
(4−α)(4−β)(1−β)α .
ix
The reduction in I ’s profit in these instances can be as high as 25%(α = .9
and β = .4).
Lemma 5 highlights the conditions under which I is likely to suffer from
dire consequences should it fail to anticipate the potential entry of the copycat
in Period 1. Specifically, when both the production cost c and entry fee
√
κ is
moderate, ignorance on the part of I can lead to the entry of C and its own exit in
Period 2 (under Subgame 2) as stated in statement 1 of Lemma 5. Had I anticipated
the potential entry of C, I could have chosen a different price in Period 1 so that
it will stay in the market while deterring C to enter the market in Period 2 (under
Subgame 1). Statement 2 can be interpreted in the same manner. We omit the
details. In summary, to avoid unnecessary reduction in profit, it is beneficial for I
to be keenly aware of the potential entry of C in Period 1 and set its price p1 in a
proactive manner. More specifically, prudence is all the more important when the
entry fee of C is moderate as this presents a case where I could have deterred the
C’s entry with a lower p1.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we have developed a two-period dynamic game model to examine
the strategic interactions (entry and pricing strategies) between an incumbent and
a copycat. Our key findings suggest that the incumbent should adopt a multiprong
approach in deterring a potential copycat. At the product level, choosing a product
which will be difficult to replicate in terms of physical resemblance bodes well to
deter the copycat, particularly for products which command a status utility for the
ix
˜P is defined in section “Entry Strategies of I and C in Equilibrium.”
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users. At the same time, the incumbent’s entry deterrence strategy can be reinforced
with frequent upgrades and updated designs of its product. The existence of a newer
version dampens the potential gain that any copycat can hope to gain from the older
version, thus deterring their entry. At the market level, incumbents should continue
to pursue legislative means to increase the entry cost for copycats. As highlighted
by Lazaro Hernandez, cofounder of Proenza Schouler in the opening paragraph,
any product design or innovation, rightly deserves protection and incumbents
should work toward securing patents and intellectual property rights in this regard.
We also show that the first-period price of the incumbent plays an important
role in deterring the copycat’s entry. In particular, under some conditions, the
incumbent deliberately lowers its first-period price, thereby reducing the market
potential for the copycat, and thus deterring its entry. More interestingly, the
presence of the copycat not only improves consumer surplus but has the potential
to increase social welfare at the same time. Thus far, this is the only article that has
established a positive role of copycats as welfare enhancing. Finally, our findings
also point to the importance for the incumbent to be proactive in anticipating the
presence of the copycat.
From the incumbent’s perspective, our key findings suggest that an incumbent
who does not endow a high production cost, employs a lower early pricing strategy
as an entry deterrent tool to keep the copycat firm out of the market. In the same
context, the incumbent should also be particularly wary of any potential copycat
for the reason that any ignorance may result in it being pushed out of the market
altogether. On the other hand, when the production cost of the incumbent is high,
other deterrent measures such as the use of patents and potential lawsuits that
increase the entry cost for the copycat are more effective. When the entry fee of
the copycat cannot be increased, our results actually propose that the incumbent
decreases customers’ valuation of copycat’s products by, for instance, educating
customers. In this way, the potential profit for the copycat firm is greatly reduced,
thus making its entry undesirable. From the perspective of the consumers, our
findings echoed conventional wisdom that copycat products improves consumers’
welfare. What is surprising though, is that even when the copycat firm does not
actually enter the market, the mere possibility of its entry is sufficient to entice an
incumbent to lower its price in the early period, thus benefiting the consumers.
Contrary to extant literature on counterfeits, our article focused exclusively
on copycat in the durable goods category. Our article represents an initial attempt to
examine the dynamic interactions between an incumbent and a copycat (with lower
production cost) with physical resemblance of the genuine product. However, there
are various remaining issues that deserve attention as future research. First, we have
assumed that the consumers are myopic, which is a reasonable assumption when
consumers care only about instant gratification or when the underlying product
is fashionable. It would be of interest to extend our analysis to the case when
consumers are strategic in the sense that they anticipate future price and future
entry and pricing strategies of the copycat. We acknowledge there are several
related papers that study multiperiod games with strategic consumers (e.g., Chen,
Narasimhan, & Zhang, 2001; Villanueva, Bhardwaj, Balasubramanian, & Chen,
2007). Due to the specific settings in those papers, evaluating the strategic behavior
of consumers is tractable, which, unfortunately, is not the case in our game setting.
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Specifically, we are considering a two-period model with heterogeneous and time-
varying consumer valuation. More importantly, we are focusing on durable goods
so that customers who purchased in Period 1 will not buy in Period 2. Because
of this reason, we need to keep track of the remaining customers in Period 2.
Consequently, the valuation of the remaining customers in Period 2 depends on
the selling price in Period 1 and the value retention factor α. This creates major
difficulty to develop tractable analysis when customers are strategic so that they
have four purchasing options in Period 1 (purchase the incumbent product in
Period 1, wait and purchase the incumbent product in Period 2 at a lower price,
wait and purchase the copycat product, and do not purchase). We shall leave
this to future research. Second, we can examine the case when both firms have
perfect information. It would be of interest to extend our analysis to the case
when there is information asymmetry so that the incumbent and the copycat can
engage in a dynamic signaling game. For example, when the copycat does not
know the incumbent product cost c, the incumbent may set a low price in period
1 as a “signal” to deceive the copycat about the incumbent’s true cost. This way,
the incumbent may be able to use this signal to deter copycat’s entrance. Third,
our model focused on regular products whose value deteriorate over time. It is
interesting to consider the case when the incumbent’s products are collectible so
that its value may increase over time. In this case, the increasing value over time
can create additional incentives for more copycats entering the market. As such, it
is of interest to examine the number of copycats entering the market over time.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
In Period 1, consumers purchase I ’s products if and only if v1 ≤ p1. Since v1 ∼
U [0, 1], we have the demand for I ’s products in Period 1 as DB1 = 1 − p1, and
profit in Period 1 as πB1 = (1 − p1)(p1 − c).
In Period 2, for those customers who did not buy in Period 1, they stay in the
market. They purchase I ’s products if and only if v2 ≥ p2. Since v2 ∼ U [0, αp1],
we have the demand for I ’s products in Period 2 as DB2 = 1α (αp1 − p2), and profit
in Period 1 as πB2 = 1α (αp1 − p2)(p1 − c).
I optimizes its own profit in Period 2 by choosing the optimal p2 given p1.
First-order-condition (FOC) gives pB2 (p1) = αp1+c2 .
Then, I optimizes its total profits in both periods under constraints αp1 ≥ p2,
and p1, p2 ≥ c.
max
p1
(1 − p1)(p1 − c) + 1α (αp1 − p2)(p2 − c)
s.t. p2(p1) = αp1+c2
αp1 ≥ p2
p1, p2 ≥ c.
FOC gives us pB1 = 2+c4−α . If c ≤ α2−α , this pB1 satisfies all the constraints.
However, if c ≥ α2−α , 2+c4−α leads to demand in Period 2 being negative. Therefore,
when c ≥ α2−α , I will not stay in Period 2. It will maximize the profit of Period 1
only.
max
p1
(1 − p1)(p1 − c)
s.t. p1 ≥ c.
FOC gives us pB1 = c+12 for c ≥ α2−α .
In summary, if c ≤ α2−α , the incumbent stays in the market for both peri-
ods and pB1 = 2+c4−α , pB2 = α+2c4−α , and πB = c
2−(3−α)αc+α
4α−α2 . However, if c >
α
2−α , the
incumbent exits the market in Period 2 and thus sets pB1 = c+12 and πB = (1−c)
2
4 .
Proof of Theorem 1
We first establish a proposition as following to facilitate our proof for Theorem 1:
Proposition A.1: Value ofp1 affects the competition status in Period 2 in following
ways:
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(1) If p1 ≤ cα , even without C, I will choose to Exit in Period 2.
(2) If p1 ≥ c(2−β)2α(1−β) , even with C, I will choose to Stay In in Period 2.
Proof:
(1) If p1 ≤ cα , all customers left in market in Period 2 have valuation v2 ∼
U [0, αp1] smaller than unit cost c. Therefore, I will not make any profit
if it stays in.
(2) (a) If C does not compete with I in Period 2, we only need p1 ≥ cα for I
to stay in. Since c
α
≤ c(2−β)2α(1−β) , when p1 ≥ c(2−β)2α(1−β) , I will always stay
in Period 2 without C.
(b) If C competes with I in Period 2, conditions needed are:
D
(3)
2 (p1, p(3)2 (p1), p(3)C (p1)) =
1
α
(
αp1 − p
(3)
2 (p1) − p(3)C (p1)
1 − β
)
≥ 0;
D
(3)
C (p1, p(3)2 (p1), p(3)C (p1)) =
1
α
(
p
(3)
2 (p1) − p(3)C (p1)
1 − β
−p
(3)
C (p1)
β
)
≥ 0.
Provided we know
p
(3)
2 (p1) = 2
α(1 − β)p1 + c
4 − β ,
p
(3)
C (p1) = β
α(1 − β)p1 + c
4 − β ,
if and only if p1 ≥ c(2−β)2α(1−β) , the two conditions above can be satisfied.
We now proceed to prove Theorem 1. We analyze the equilibrium under
different cost intervals. For each cost interval, we further divide it into three
cases, p1 <
c
α
,
c
α
≤ p1 < c(2−β)2α(1−β) , and p1 ≥ c(2−β)2α(1−β) according to Proposition A.1.
Equilibrium is determined by choosing the optimal p1 with highest profit.
1. Suppose c > α2−α , then we have
c(2−β)
2α(1−β) ≥ 1. We only have two cases
based on p1, p1 < cα , and
c
α
≤ p1 < 1.
(a) Suppose we fix the price interval of p1 as p1 < cα , I will choose to
Exit in Period 2. Therefore, it only maximize its profit in Period 1,
π1 = (1 − p1)(p1 − c). FOC gives p∗1 = c+12 . Hence, π∗1 = (1−c)
2
4 .
If C decides to enter the market in Period 2. C can obtain profit
of πC = 1αβ (αβp∗1 − pc)pc. FOC gives p∗C = αβ2 p∗1 = αβ(c+1)4 . Max-
imum profit is π∗C = αβ(c+1)
2
16 − κ . Therefore, when
√
κ >
√
αβ(c+1)
4 ,
the copycat firm C chooses to Stay Out (Subgame 4), otherwise C
chooses to Enter and p∗C = αβ(c+1)4 (Subgame 2).(b) Suppose we then fix the price interval of p1 as cα ≤ p1 < 1, similar
analysis is done. We have p∗1 = cα . Hence, π∗1 = (1 − cα )( cα − c). The
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profit of I in this price interval is smaller than that of the previous
price interval of p1 ∈ [0, cα ).
Therefore, when c > α2−α , we have equilibrium indicated in case 1a.
2. Suppose 2α(1−β)2−β < c <
α
2−α
x
, then we still have c(2−β)2α(1−β) ≥ 1. Only two
price intervals are studied, p1 < cα , and
c
α
≤ p1 < 1.
(a) Suppose we fix the price interval of p1 as p1 < cα , similar analysis
gives p∗1 = cα , π∗1 = (1 − cα )( cα − c).(b) Suppose we then fix the price interval of p1 as cα ≤ p1 < 1.
(i)when √κ <
√
αβ ˜P
2 , we have p
∗
1 = c+12 , π∗1 = (1−c)
2
4 ; p
∗
C = αβ(c+1)4 ,
and π∗C = αβ(c+1)
2
16 − κ (Subgame 2).
(ii)when
√
αβ ˜P
4 <
√
κ <
√
αβ(2+c)
2(4−α) , we havep
∗
1 = 2√αβ
√
κ ,p∗2 = αp
∗
1+c
2 ,
π∗1 = (1 − p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2 (Subgame 1).
(iii)when √κ >
√
αβ(2+c)
2(4−α) , we have p
∗
1 = 2+c4−α , p∗2 =
αp∗1+c
2 , π
∗
1 = (1 −
p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2 (Subgame 1).
Cases in 2b always surpass case 2a for I in terms of profit. Therefore,
when 2α(1−β)2−β < c <
α
2−α , we have equilibrium indicated in case 2b.
3. Suppose 4α(1−β)4(2−α)−β(4−3α) < c <
2α(1−β)
2−β , we have
c(2−β)
2α(1−β) < 1. Three price
intervals are studied, p1 < cα ,
c
α
≤ p1 < c(2−β)2α(1−β) , and p1 ≥ c(2−β)2α(1−β) .
(a) Suppose we fix the price interval of p1 as p1 < cα , similar analysis
gives p∗1 = cα , π∗1 = (1 − cα )( cα − c).
(b) Suppose we then fix the price interval of p1 as cα ≤ p1 < c(2−β)2α(1−β) .
(i)When √κ < αβ ˜P2 , we have p∗1 = c+12 , π∗1 = (1−c)
2
4 ; p
∗
C = αβ(c+1)4 ,
and π∗C = αβ(c+1)
2
16 − κ (Subgame 2).
(ii)When αβ ˜P )2 <
√
κ <
αβ(2+c)
2(4−α) , we have p
∗
1 = 2√αβ
√
κ ,p∗2 = αp
∗
1+c
2 ,
π∗1 = (1 − p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2; (Subgame 1).
(iii)When √κ > αβ(2+c)2(4−α) , we have p∗1 = 2+c4−α , p∗2 =
αp∗1+c
2 , π
∗
1 = (1 −
p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2; (Subgame 1).
(c) Suppose we then fix the price interval of p1 as p1 ≥ c(2−β)2α(1−β) .
(i)When √κ < c2
√
β
α(1−β) , we have p
∗
1 = c(2−β)2α(1−β) , π∗1 = (1 −
c(2−β)
2α(1−β) )( c(2−β)2α(1−β) − c); p∗C = cβ2 , and π∗C = βc
2
4(1−β) − κ (Subgame
2).
(ii)When √κ > c2
√
β
α(1−β) , we have p
∗
1 = c(2−β)2α(1−β) , p∗2 =
αp∗1+c
2 , π
∗
1 =
(1 − p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2; (Subgame 1).
Cases in 3b always surpass cases 3a and 3c for I in terms of profit. There-
fore, when 4α(1−β)(2−α)(4−β(2−α)) < c <
2α(1−β)
2−β , we have equilibrium indicated
in case 3b.
x We assume 2α(1−β)2−β <
α
2−α in our proof. The other case can be proved in the same way, and result is the
same.
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4. Suppose α(1−β)1+(1−α)(1−β) < c <
4α(1−β)
4(2−α)−β(4−3α) , we have
c(2−β)
2α(1−β) < 1. Three
price intervals are studied, p1 < cα ,
c
α
≤ p1 < c(2−β)2α(1−β) , and p1 ≥
c(2−β)
2α(1−β) .
(a) Suppose we fix the price interval of p1 as p1 < cα , similar analysis
gives p∗1 = cα , π∗1 = (1 − cα )( cα − c).
(b) Suppose we then fix the price interval of p1 as cα ≤ p1 < c(2−β)2α(1−β) .
(i)When √κ <
√
αβ ˜P
2 , we have p
∗
1 = c+12 , π∗1 = (1−c)
2
4 ; p
∗
C = αβ(c+1)4 ,
and π∗C = αβ(c+1)
2
16 − κ (Subgame 2).
(ii)When
√
αβ ˜P
2 <
√
κ <
√
αβc(2−β)
4α(1−β) , we have p
∗
1 = 2√αβ
√
κ ,p∗2 =
αp∗1+c
2 , π
∗
1 = (1 − p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2; (Subgame 1).
(iii)When √κ >
√
αβc(2−β)
4α(1−β) , we have p
∗
1 = c(2−β)2α(1−β) , p∗2 =
αp∗1+c
2 , π
∗
1 =
(1 − p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2 (Subgame 1).
(c) Suppose we then fix the price interval of p1 as p1 ≥ c(2−β)2α(1−β) .
(i)When √κ < c2
√
β
α(1−β) , we have p
∗
1 = c(2−β)2α(1−β) , π∗1 = (1 −
c(2−β)
2α(1−β) )( c(2−β)2α(1−β) − c); p∗C = cβ2 , and π∗C = c
2
4α(1−β) − κ (Subgame
2).
(ii)When √κ > c2
√
β
α(1−β) and (4 − β)
√
κ
αβ(1−β) − cα(1−β) < 2+c4−α , we
have p∗1 = (4 − β)
√
κ
αβ(1−β) − cα(1−β) , p∗2 =
αp∗1+c
2 , π
∗
1 = (1 −
p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2 (Subgame 1).
(iii)When (4 − β)
√
κ
αβ(1−β) − cα(1−β) > 2+c4−α , we have p∗1 = 2+c4−α , p∗2 =
αp∗1+c
2 , π
∗
1 = (1 − p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2 (Subgame 1).
Comparing I ’s profit in each cases, we have the equilibrium summarized
as follows.
If
√
κ ≤
√
αβ ˜P
2 , the incumbent I will Exit while C chooses to Enter and
p∗1 = c+12 , p∗C = αβ(c+1)4 (Subgame 2). If
√
κ >
√
αβ ˜P
2 , I chooses to Stay
In and C chooses to Stay Out and p∗1 is as follows while p∗2 = αp
∗
1+c
2(Subgame 1).
p∗1 Conditions
min( 2√
αβ
√
κ, 2+c4−α ) c ∈ (c2, c1)
2√
αβ
√
κ c ∈ (c3, c2), and √κ < c2
√
β
α(1−β)
min( 4−β
α
√
ακ
β(1−β) − cα(1−β) , 2+c4−α ) c ∈ (c3, c2), and
√
κ > c2
√
β
α(1−β)
5. Suppose c < α(1−β)1+(1−α)(1−β) , we have
c(2−β)
2α(1−β) < 1. Three price intervals are
studied, p1 < cα ,
c
α
≤ p1 < c(2−β)2α(1−β) , and p1 ≥ c(2−β)2α(1−β) .
(a) Suppose we fix the price interval of p1 as p1 < cα , similar analysis
gives p∗1 = cα , π∗1 = (1 − cα )( cα − c).
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(b) Suppose we then fix the price interval of p1 as cα ≤ p1 < c(2−β)2α(1−β) .
(i)When √κ <
√
αβ(2−β)c
4α(1−β) , we have p
∗
1 = c(2−β)2α(1−β) , π∗1 = (1 −
c(2−β)
2α(1−β) )( c(2−β)2α(1−β) − c); p∗C = cβ2 , and π∗C = c
2
4α(1−β) − κ (Subgame
2).
(ii)When √κ > β(2−β)c4(1−β) , we have p∗1 = c(2−β)2α(1−β) , p∗2 =
αp∗1+c
2 , π
∗
1 =
(1 − p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2 (Subgame 1).
(c) Suppose we then fix the price interval of p1 as p1 ≥ c(2−β)2α(1−β) .
(i)When √κ <
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) ), we have p∗1 = pI , p∗2 =
αp∗1+c
2 , p
∗
C = p1C , where pI = Mc+(4−β)
2
N
, M = (4 − β)2 −
4(2 − β), N = 2(4 − β)2 − 8α(1 − β), p1C = βc(M(1−β)α+N)N(4−β) +
β(4−β)(1−β)α
N
.
π∗1 = (M
2
2N + (2−β)
2
(1−β)α ) c
2
(4−β)2 + (MN − 1)c + (4−β)
2
2N , and π
∗
C =
β
N2(4−β)2(1−β)α ((α(1 − β)M + N)c + α(4 − β)2(1 − β))2 − κ(Subgame 3).
(ii)When √κ >
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) ) and (4 − β)
√
κ
αβ(1−β) −
c
α(1−β) >
2+c
4−α <
2+c
4−α , we have p
∗
1 = (4 − β)
√
κ
αβ(1−β) − cα(1−β) >
2+c
4−α , p
∗
2 = αp
∗
1+c
2 , π
∗
1 = (1 − p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2 (Subgame
1).
(iii)When (4 − β)
√
κ
αβ(1−β) − cα(1−β) > 2+c4−α > 2+c4−α , we have p∗1 =
2+c
4−α , p
∗
2 = αp
∗
1+c
2 , π
∗
1 = (1 − p∗1)(p∗1 − c) + 1α (
αp∗1−c
2 )2 (Subgame
1).
Then incumbent I will Stay In. If
√
κ <
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) ), then I
will set p∗1 = Mc+(4−β)
2
N
and p∗2 = αp
∗
1+c
2 , while C will Enter and set
p∗C = βc(M(1−β)α+N)N(4−β) + β(4−β)(1−β)αN (under Subgame 3). Otherwise, C
chooses to Stay Out and I will set p∗1 = min( 4−βα
√
ακ
β(1−β) − cα(1−β) , 2+c4−α ),
p∗2 = αp
∗
1+c
2 (under Subgame 1).
In summary, the equilibrium outcomes are presented in the table as follow:
Conditions on c Conditions on κ Subgame p∗1
( α2−α , 1)
√
κ <
√
αβ(c+1)
4 2
c+1
2√
κ >
√
αβ(c+1)
4 4
c+1
2
( 4α(1−β)4(2−α)β(4−3α) , α2−α )
√
κ <
√
αβ ˜P
2 2
c+1
2√
κ >
αβ(c+1)
4 1 min( 2√αβ
√
κ, 2+c4−α )
( α(1−β)1+(1−α)(1−β) , 4α(1−β)4(2−α)−β(4−3α) )
√
κ <
√
αβ ˜P
2 2
c+1
2√
αβ ˜P
2 <
√
κ < c2
√
β
α(1−β) 1
2√
αβ
√
κ
√
κ > c2
√
β
α(1−β) 1 min( 4−βα
√
ακ
β(1−β) − cα(1−β) , 2+c4−α )
(0, α(1−β)1+(1−α)(1−β) )
√
κ <
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) ) 3 pI√
κ >
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) ), 1 2+c4−α
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Proof of Lemma 2
From the proof of Theorem 1, we know there are four candidates of optimal prices
when Subgame 1 is the equilibrium case.
Conditions on c Conditions on κ p∗1
(c2, c1)
√
κ >
αβ(c+1)
4 min( 2√αβ
√
κ, 2+c4−α )
(c3, c2)
√
αβ ˜P
2 <
√
κ < c2
√
β
α(1−β)
2√
αβ
√
κ
√
κ > c2
√
β
α(1−β) min( 4−βα
√
ακ
β(1−β) − cα(1−β) , 2+c4−α )
(0, c3)
√
κ >
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) ), 2+c4−α
It is easy to see for all the four cases except the second case, p∗1 ≤ 2+c4−α (= pB1 ).
For the second case, due to the condition that c ∈ (c3, c2) and
√
αβ ˜P
2 <
√
κ <
c
2
√
β
α(1−β) , we can derive an upper bound of
√
κ as
(2+c)√αβ
2(4−α) through a series of
algebra. This is equivalent to 2√
αβ
√
κ ≤ 2+c4−α (= pB1 ).
For Subgame 1,p∗2(p∗1) = αp
∗
1+c
2 >
αpB1 +c
2 = pB2 (pB2 ). Hence we have Lemma
2.
Proof of Lemma 3
Let CSBa = 18 (1 − c)2, and CSBb = 18 (α + 4)(( 2+c4−α − c+4α+4 )2 + 1α ( 2(α−c)α+4 )2). The
comparison of consumer surplus between the Base Model; and equilibrium sub-
games are summarized in the table as below.
Conditions on c Conditions on κ CS comparison
( α2−α , 1)
√
κ <
√
αβ(c+1)
4 CS
(2)(p∗1, 0, p∗C) > CSBa√
κ >
√
αβ(c+1)
4 CS
(4)(p∗1, 0, 0) = CSBa
( 4α(1−β)4(2−α)−β(4−3α) , α2−α )
√
κ <
√
αβ ˜P
2 CS
(2)(p∗1, 0, p∗C) > CSBb√
κ >
√
αβ ˜P
2 CS
(1)(p∗1, p∗2, 0) ≥ CSBb
( α(1−β)1+(1−α)(1−β) , 4α(1−β)4(2−α)−β(4−3α) )
√
κ <
√
αβ ˜P
2 CS
(2)(p∗1, 0, p∗C) > CSBb
√
κ >
√
αβ ˜P
2 ,
√
κ < c2
√
β
α(1−β) CS
(1)(p∗1, p∗2, 0) ≥ CSBb
√
κ > c2
√
β
α(1−β) CS
(1)(p∗1, p∗2, 0) ≥ CSBb
(0, α(1−β)1+(1−α)(1−β) )
√
κ <
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) ) CS(3)(p∗1, p∗2, p∗C) > CSBb√
κ >
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) ) CS(1)(p∗1, p∗2, 0) ≥ CSBb
We can see, compared to the Base Model, consumer surplus is always no
lower even when the copycat is deterred entry by the incumbent.
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Proof of Lemma 4
Let SSBa = πB + 18 (1 − c)2, and SSBb = πB + 18 (α + 4)(( 2+c4−α − c+4α+4 )2 +
1
α
( 2(α−c)
α+4 )2). The comparison of consumer surplus between the Base Model and
equilibrium subgames are summarized in the table as below.
Conditions on c Conditions on κ SS comparison
( α2−α , 1)
√
κ <
√
αβ(c+1)
4 SS
(2)2(p∗1, 0, p∗C) > SSBa√
κ >
√
αβ(c+1)
4 SS
(4)(p∗1, 0, 0) = SSBa
( 4α(1−β)4(2−α)−β(4−3α) , α2−α )
√
κ <
√
αβ ˜P
2 SS
(2)(p∗1, 0, p∗C) > SSBb√
κ >
√
αβ ˜P
2 SS
(1)(p∗1, p∗2, 0) ≥ SSBb
( α(1−β)1+(1−α)(1−β) , 4α(1−β)4(2−α)−β(4−3α) )
√
κ <
√
αβ ˜P
2 SS
(2)(p∗1, 0, p∗C) > SSBb
√
κ >
√
αβ ˜P
2 ,
√
κ < c2
√
β
α(1−β) SS
(1)(p∗1, p∗2, 0) ≥ SSBb
√
κ > c2
√
β
α(1−β) SS
(1)(p∗1, p∗2, 0) ≥ SSBb
(0, α(1−β)1+(1−α)(1−β) )
√
κ <
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) ) SS(3)(p∗1, p∗2, p∗C) > SSBb√
κ >
√
αβ(1−β)
4−β ( ˆP + cα(1−β) ) SS(1)(p∗1, p∗2, 0) ≥ SSBb
We can see, compared to the Base Model, social surplus is always no lower
even when the copycat is deterred entry by the incumbent.
Proof of Lemma 5
(1) For c ∈ ( 4α(1−β)4(2−α)−β(4−3α) , α2−α ) and
√
κ ∈ (
√
αβ(c+1)
4 ,
√
αβ(2+c)
2(4−α) ), the equilib-
rium shown in Theorem 1 suggests if I is not ignorant, it should have
chosen p1 as 2√αβ
√
κ to deter C’s entry, leading to Subgame 1.
However, since I does not anticipate the existence of C, in Period 1, it
has already chosen a price level, p1 = pB1 . Under this cost interval, the
demand in Period 2 for I if it still stays in,D(3)2 (pB1 , p(3)2 (pB1 ), p(3)C (pB1 )) =
1
α
(αpB1 − p
(3)
2 (pB1 )−p(3)C (pB1 )
1−β ) will be smaller than 0. Therefore, I ends up
choosing to exit in Period 2, and C chooses to enter.
(2) For c ∈ ( α(1−β)1+(1−α)(1−β) , 4α(1−β)4(2−α)−β(4−3α) ) and
√
αβ ˜P
2 ≤
√
κ <
√
αβ(1−β)(2α(1−β)+(4−αβ)c)
(4−α)(4−β)(1−β)α , the equilibrium shown in Theorem 1
suggests if I is not ignorant, it should have chosen p1 among 2√αβ
√
κ ,
and 4−β
α
√
ακ
β(1−β) − cα(1−β) to deter C’s entry, leading to Subgame 1.
However, since I does not anticipate the existence of C, in Period 1,
it has already chosen a price level, p1 = pB1 . Under this cost inter-
val, the demand C if it chooses to enter, D(3)C (pB1 , p(3)2 (pB1 ), p(3)C (pB1 )) =
1
α
(p
(3)
2 (pB1 )−p(3)C (pB1 )
1−β −
p
(3)
C (pB1 )
β
) will be greater than 0. Moreover, the profit
of C will be higher than the case when I is not ignorant. Therefore, given
the same entry cost κ , C chooses to enter and compete with I .
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